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“I don’t think there will be any kind of an end for whaling by Japan⋮we have a long 
historical tradition and culture of whaling⋮criticism of the practice is a cultural attack, a 
kind of prejudice against Japanese culture.”
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, February 2013  
(News.com.au 2013)
“The more the whaling issue becomes a racial or moral one, the more the Japanese will 
become unwilling to accept it⋮It has become a matter of international pride.”
Fisheries Agency Assistant Director Okamoto Junichiro, March 1989  
(quoted in Miyaoka 2004: 96)
Introduction: Drive Fishery for Dolphins
In May 2015, the Japan Association of Zoos 
and Aquariums (JAZA) decided to ban member 
aquariums from acquiring dolphins caught by 
drive fishery (oikomi-ryo¯), a method of fishing 
that drives dolphins into a cove by banging 
metal poles. The decision was in response to 
the suspension the previous month of JAZA’s 
membership of the World Association of Zoos 
and Aquariums (WAZA) who deemed drive 
fishing cruel and unethical. If JAZA had not 
acquiesced to the international body’s de-
mands, Japan’s zoos faced being unable to lease 
rare species from overseas for breeding and 
other purposes. JAZA’s “capitulation”, as the 
Yomiuri described it, to gaiatsu or international 
pressure is in stark contrast to Japan’s contin-
ued whale hunting which, despite international 
disapproval and legal rulings, continues una-
bated (The Japan News 2015a). 
One similarity between the dolphin inci-
dent and the debate on whaling was the denial 
of outside arguments that such fishing is “cru-
el” and the assertion that as “traditional Japa-
nese culture” it deserves to be protected and 
continued. “WAZA’s lopsided attitude of paying 
no attention at all to a fishing culture unique to 
Japan,” argued an editorial in the Yomiuri, 
“while failing to specify what particular as-
pects of the fishing method should be deemed 
cruel, is extremely problematic” (The Japan 
News 2015a). The same publication, in an arti-
cle entitled “‘Cruelty’ charge bewilders Taiji”, 
described “discontent and questions” about 
what exactly was cruel about drive fishery 
alongside details on improved culling tech-
niques (The Japan News 2015b).1 One feature of 
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2the media coverage of this incident was the giv-
ing of voice to fishermen and other self-inter-
ested parties at the expense of ordinary citi-
zens and Japanese animal rights groups.
The JAZA/WAZA dispute of May 2015 may 
provide some hints when attempting to answer 
one of the central questions in this paper: why 
has Japan’s whale hunting remained immune 
from the effects of gaiatsu? While international 
pressure — particularly UN and US pressure 
— on Japan has been strikingly successful in 
areas as diverse as trade, gender equality, in-
digenous people’s rights, and child-custody, Ja-
pan has remained unmoved by harsh interna-
tional disapproval and even legal rulings 
against its whale hunts in the Pacific and Ant-
arctic. The paper proceeds as follows: part one 
defines and introduces the concept of gaiatsu 
together with relevant examples. Part two 
looks at Japanese whaling in historical per-
spective. Part three examines the various in-
ternational pressures brought to bear on Japan 
to end whaling and the Japanese government’s 
response, while part four describes how, in the 
domestic sphere, whaling has come to symbol-
ize national pride, identity, and the Japanese 
race itself. The conclusion notes that height-
ened international pressure has had the oppo-
site of the intended effect, actually strengthen-
ing Japanese support of whaling.
1. Gaiatsu (International Pressure)
The “gunboat diplomacy” forced opening of 
Japan to American trade by Commodore Perry 
between 1852 and 1854 and the ensuing une-
qual treaties is probably the most famous ex-
ample of gaiatsu. In more recent years, gaiatsu 
has been most closely linked to trade liberalisa-
tion, particularly agricultural trade liberalisa-
tion. Schoppa (1993), for example, in a study of 
the 1989-1993 US-Japanese negotiations 
known as the Structural Impediments Initia-
tive (SII), examines the pressure put on Japan 
by the US to reform “structural barriers” to the 
expansion of US exports. Schoppa (1993: 368) 
concludes that “international pressure can 
make a difference” but qualifies this by saying 
that “domestic political context matters as 
well.” This includes both public opinion and 
elite interests: elite and general public involve-
ment and local media attention. In other words, 
the effectiveness of foreign pressure is not just 
about the strength of the demands but also 
about how these demands “resonate” in domes-
tic politics (Schoppa 1993: 386). Schoppa uses 
Putnam’s “two-level game” theory to frame his 
argument. Also drawing on this model is Mul-
gan (1997) who notes that foreign pressure was 
often effective because it formed a convenient 
focus around which domestic pro-liberalisation 
forces could mobilise, adding crucial momen-
tum to market opening.
The international /domestic “two-level 
game” theory also explains the success of a 
number of other recent examples of foreign 
pressure. One example was Japan’s indigenous 
Ainu who had long been denied recognition de-
spite criticism and pressure from the United 
Nations. It was only in 1997 when a Japanese 
judge recognised, in a case over the construc-
tion of the Nibutani Dam, that the Ainu were 
an indigenous minority that the government 
was forced to act, passing the Promotion of 
Ainu Culture Act in the same year. The mo-
mentum this provided for indigenous groups 
and their supporters in Japan undoubtedly in-
fluenced Japan’s decision to sign the 2007 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
which in turn prompted official government 
recognition of the Ainu in 2008. Another exam-
ple of the importance of domestic actors was the 
ratification of the international land-mine ban 
in 1998. Despite international pressure, Japan 
had initially been dragging its feet on signing 
the accord. However, a rapidly expanding civil 
society, particularly post-1995, saw growing 
awareness of global issues at the grassroots 
level in Japan. Ultimately, Japanese NGOs, 
riding a wave of public interest in the issue, 
played a key role in pushing the government to 
ratify the international land-mine ban in 1998 
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despite American opposition (Hirata 2002: 121).
A counter-example, which also supports 
the “two-level game” theory, relates to racial 
discrimination. Although, the UN Internation-
al Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) came into ef-
fect in 1969, Japan was one of the last (devel-
oped) countries to ratify it when it did so in 
1995. However, since ratification Japan has 
come under constant criticism by the UN for 
not introducing domestic legislation against 
racial discrimination despite its obligation to do 
so in the treaty:
The Committee noted with concern that 
although article 98 of the Constitution pro-
vided that treaties ratified by Japan were 
part of domestic law, the provisions of the 
Convention had rarely been applied by na-
tional courts. In light of the information 
from Japan that the direct application of 
treaty provisions was judged in each spe-
cific case, the Committee sought clarifying 
information from Japan on the status of 
the Convention and its provisions in do-
mestic law (United Nations 2001)
However, despite frequent reminders that it is 
necessary for Japan to adopt specific legislation 
to outlaw racial discrimination, no progress on 
this issue has been made. Calls to adopt domes-
tic legislation heightened with the emergence of 
hate-speech demonstrations against Koreans in 
2013; in July 2014, the UN Human Rights Com-
mission recommended outlawing hate-speech 
(Japan News 2014b) while the following month 
the CERD Committee reminded Japan again of 
its obligation to “to reject all forms of propagan-
da aimed at justifying or promoting racial ha-
tred and discrimination and take legal action 
against them” (Japan News 2014c). However, 
despite some political discussion on the issue of 
hate speech, there have been no moves to enact 
a domestic law on racial discrimination. A key 
reason for intransience may be the lack of popu-
lar interest in this issue; Japan has a relatively 
small foreign population (some 1.6% of the total 
population) and a strong emphasis on assimila-
tion and homogeneity. There is also marked op-
position towards increased migration: a recent 
Yomiuri poll found that 61% of Japanese were 
against allowing in foreigners who want to set-
tle in Japan as migrants (Yomiuri Shimbun 
2015). In sum, it is not an issue that arouses 
much public interest or sympathy and there is 
little political benefit to introducing legislation.
In the above example, the lack of direct US 
pressure on Japan might be considered signifi-
cant given the special relationship between the 
two countries. However, another issue the UN 
has frequently brought up is the so-called 
“comfort women” issue and this is an issue 
which in recent years the US has grown in-
creasingly vocal about. The UN Human Rights 
Committee cited above made the following 
comments about the “comfort women” issue:
The Committee urged Japan to express a 
public apology and officially recognize the 
responsibility of the state over the comfort 
women issue. It also recommend Japan ed-
ucate students and the general public on 
the issue, including by making adequate 
references in textbooks (Japan News 2014b)
In contrast to the discussion on racial discrimi-
nation and hate speech, the US has taken an 
increasingly criticial stand on this issue, espe-
cially since US House of Representatives House 
Resolution 121 was passed in 2007. Like the 
UN demands above, the Resolution asked the 
Japanese government for an apology and better 
education. Moreover, in 2012, then Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton was reported to have re-
jected the euphemism “comfort women” in fa-
vour of “enforced sex slaves” (Japan Today 
2012). Finally, statues have been erected in a 
number of US towns by citizen groups in mem-
ory of the “comfort women.” However, Japan 
has actually removed references to “comfort 
women” in school textbooks in recent years 
(Asahi Shimbun 2015a; 2015b), while Abe’s Au-
4gust 2015 statement to mark the 70th anniver-
sary of the end of WWII while offering a gener-
al apology made only indirect reference to the 
“comfort women.”2 In sum, the “comfort women” 
issue has become inextricably tied up with pat-
riotism, nationalism, and national pride and as 
such has become something of a taboo topic in 
Japan, discussion of which risks raising the ire 
of conservative right-wing groups. In this re-
spect, there may be parallels with the issue of 
whaling.
2. Japanese Whaling
It is important to understand the history of 
whaling in Japan if one is to make sense of the 
Japanese government’s position on whaling to-
day. As Table 1 shows, “active” whaling only 
began at the start of the 17th century, with Tai-
ji, a town of some three and a half thousand in 
Wakayama, having the longest continuous as-
sociation. However, by the end of the nine-
teenth century, “traditional” net-fishing, which 
began in Taiji, was in major decline. The intro-
duction of American and Norwegian technology 
during this period marks the start of “modern” 
Japanese whaling and large-type coastal whal-
ing (LTCW) became an established industry. 
The 1930s also saw the advent of factory-ship 
(pelagic) whaling in the Antarctic Ocean and 
this continued post-war when GHQ gave per-
mission for Japanese whaling f leets to fish 
there in order to overcome food shortages. The 
post-war period saw a free-for-all race to kill as 
many whales as possible known as the “Whal-
ing Olympics”, something which finally ended 
in 1987 when the 1982 IWC moratorium came 
into effect.
The Japanese government’s position on 
whaling rests on two key premises which are 
not always consistent with the historical re-
cord: (1) there is a long and deep relationship 
between the Japanese and whales: whaling is 
traditional Japanese historical culture and (2) 
eating whale is Japanese food culture (Consu-
late General of Japan (Sydney) 2015). 
In supporting the former, the government 
points to “artefacts from the Stone Age,  tradi-
tional  arts,  gravestones  and monuments” as 
well as ancient poetry, folk festivals, and even 
puppetry as proving the importance of the 
whale in Japanese society (Consulate General 
of Japan (Sydney) 2015). In supporting the lat-
ter position, the government argues that the 
consumption of whale meat “spread widely 
throughout Japan during the Edo era (AD 
1600–1867)” and was eaten in various prefec-
tures across the country (Consulate General of 
Japan (Sydney) 2015). 
Hiroyuki Watanabe (2009), in Japan’s 
Whaling: The Politics of Culture in Historical 
Perspective, challenges both government asser-
tions, questioning (1) the claim that whaling is 
“traditional Japanese culture” and asking (2) 
how complex and diverse human-whale rela-
tions in Japan have become reduced to the sin-
gle relationship of killing whales for their meat. 
On the first point, Watanabe (2009: 48) argues 
that “traditional” net whaling practiced in a 
small number of coastal communities3 and 
modern Japanese whaling based on Norwegian 
technology are “completely different.” As proof 
he (2009: chapter 2, 164) cites examples of vio-
lent opposition to the spread of the whaling in-
 2 “We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honor and dignity were severely in-
jured” (Japan News 2015c).
 3 For most of these small coastal communities the history of whaling is not very long. For example, since 1987 Japan 
has pushed the IWC for small-type coastal whaling (STCW) practiced in Abashiri, Ayukawa, Wadaura, and Taiji 
to be given rights similar to aboriginal subsistence whaling. However, aside from Taiji whaling was not intro-
duced in these communities until the twentieth century and whaling remains of limited importance to the towns 
as a whole (Kalland and Moeran 1992: chapter 2). Nevertheless, and despite international opposition, Japan’s 
small type coastal whaling “remains as a priority issue for Japan”, something which was re-emphasised follow-
ing the devastation suffered in Ayukawa following the March 2011 tsunami (Fisheries Agency 2011).
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Year Event
~16 cent. ① “Passive whaling” (dead or wounded whales caught)
1600 ② Emergence of “active whaling” (small-type coastal whaling=STCW)
1606 Taiji, Wakayama: first organized large-scale whaling (harpoons)
1675 ③ Net Whaling introduced in Wakayama
~1896 Decline of traditional net-whaling/introduction of ④US-style whaling
1897–1908 Introduction of ⑤Norwegian-style whaling (explosive harpoons)
1909–1933 To¯yo¯ company creates whaling monopoly: modern coastal whaling for 
large-type whales (LTCW) becomes firmly established
1911 Riot and burning of Toyo Whaling Station in Same, Aomori
1934–1941 ⑥ Advent of factory-ship (pelagic) whaling (Antarctic Ocean)
1942–1945 Suspension of factory-ship whaling
1946 International Whaling Commission (IWC) set up under the terms of the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)
GHQ gives permission for whaling fleets to fish in Antarctic Ocean in 
order to overcome food shortages
1951 Japan joins IWC
1960 Japan becomes the leading whaling nation 
1982 IWC agrees moratorium on whaling
1987 IWC moratorium comes into effect
Japan’s Antarctic “research whaling” begins (JARPA)
1994 Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary Created (only Japan votes against)
North Pacific “research whaling” begins (JARPN)
2010 Australia takes Japan to Hague International Court of Justice (ICJ)
2014 ICJ rules Japan’s “research” whaling not scientific, demands halt
Source: Watanabe (2009: chapter 1 and throughout); Kalland (1992: chapters 2-3, 90)
Table 1: The History of Japanese Whaling
dustry in the early 20th century and stresses 
“the danger in designating any large industry 
the ‘culture’ of a particular nation-state or eth-
nic group.” Certainly, given the regional diver-
sity among the mostly remote local whaling 
communities, the only feasible way to talk 
about a single national integrated whaling cul-
ture is through the existence of a unified whal-
ing industry (Kalland and Moeran 1992: chap-
ter 8).In relation to the second argument, 
Watanabe points out that the current focus on 
“whales for meat” stems from the Japanese 
government’s sponsorship of whaling as a kind 
of “national industry”, closely bound to imperi-
alism and empire. He (2009: 99) notes that the 
stimulus for the spread of whale meat con-
sumption from the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry was “vigorous promotion by the whaling in-
dustry” and even then argues that whale meat 
only came to be widely eaten as part of the dai-
ly diet after 1946 as the result of food shortag-
es. He (2009: 99, 121) concludes that there is no 
evidence that “the eating of whale meat is part 
of the traditional food culture of the Japanese 
race.” Today, there is very little demand for 
whale meat especially among the younger pop-
ulation: “As domestic consumption of whale 
meat has plunged in recent decades, some Jap-
anese are sceptical of the worth of spending 
several million yen each year on research 
whaling” (Japan News 2014a).4 Nevertheless, 
the official position is that eating whale meat is 
an untouchable traditional culture rooted in 
history:
 4 Today, annual whale meat consumption in Japan is around 4,000-5,000 tons a year, a sharp fall from the peak of 
more than 200,000 tons in the early 1960s (Japan Times 2015b).
6Asking Japan to abandon this part of its 
culture would compare to Australians be-
ing asked to stop eating meat pies, Ameri-
cans being asked to stop eating hamburg-
ers and the English being asked to go 
without fish and chips…whaling in Japan 
was mainly carried out for the production 
of meat, and because of strong demand for 
whale-meat in the domestic market, whal-
ing can still continue to be viable (Japan 
Whaling Association 2015)
This would suggest the whaling has become a 
symbol of Japanese national identity, an expla-
nation which might help to explain Japan’s re-
sistance to international pressure. This is ex-
amined in detail in the following section.
3.  Whale Hunting and International Pressure 
(Gaiatsu)
Japan’s decision to comply with the 1982 
IWC moratorium was certainly influenced by 
gaiatsu, coming as it did under threat of an in-
ternational boycott. Japan’s decision was in 
contrast to Norway and Iceland who objected to 
the moratorium and went on to set their own 
quotas; since 1994, Norway has been whaling 
commercially and Iceland began hunting com-
mercially in September 2006 (Wikipedia 2015). 
Japan did lodge a formal objection at the time 
but, in a clear case of gaiatsu, this was later 
withdrawn due to US threats to reduce their 
fishing quota within US waters (Hirata 2005: 
132). This shows that Japan was susceptible to 
international pressure at the time of the mora-
torium.
In the ensuing years, similar threats have 
come from the US in an effort to persuade Ja-
pan to reduce or abandon whaling. For exam-
ple, Denaher (2002: 116) notes that the US cer-
tified Japan in 1988, 1995, and 2000 under the 
Pelly Amendment, though the lack of concrete 
sanctions probably reflected uncertainty over 
the legality of such sanctions. Denaher (2002: 
116) concludes that such actions show “how the 
United States has threatened to challenge the 
pro-whaling stance of the Fisheries Agency, 
and this is a form of outside pressure or gaiatsu 
(leverage in international trade).” Ultimately, 
though, US pressure has been ineffective. As 
Salles (2014) has argued, Japan is certainly 
aware that despite being berated by the US at 
the IWC, America today probably has greater 
concerns than Japan’s whaling:
With environmentalist concerns losing 
ground on the global political agenda, it is 
difficult to envision any sort of sanctions 
by the United States if Japan follows 
through with its intentions. With a grow-
ing interest in strengthening military and 
economic ties with Japan, the U.S. is com-
prehensibly uneasy about aggravating 
Japanese nationalist sensitivities; in fact, 
the Obama administration has openly 
shown signs that it would support a lift of 
the moratorium
Overall, Japan has been relatively content5 to 
work within the IWC programme — rather 
than go the path of Norway or Iceland — since 
its research whaling has allowed it, to some ex-
tent, to circumvent the ban while at the same 
time deflect criticism by saying its actions con-
form to international law (Salles 2014). Indeed, 
Danaher (2002) argues that underlying Japan’s 
pro-whaling stance are a number of consistent 
principles which it holds important, namely re-
spect for (1) the legally binding rules of inter-
 5 Of course, Japan (says it) would prefer for the moratorium to be lifted and to resume commercial whaling and has 
consistently tabled such bids at IWC meets. For example, the 2010 IWC Conference in Morocco rejected Japan’s 
proposal that it be allowed to resume limited commercial whaling if it agreed to cut its scientific quota in the 
Southern Ocean (ABC-News 2010). However, Ishii and Okubo (2007) actually argue that Japan’s real goal is the 
continuation of “research” whaling and that calls to resume commercial whaling are simply a smoke-screen.
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national treaties and (2) science-based man-
agement of international resources. “That 
Japan would sacrifice so much international 
goodwill for this practice,” notes Danaher 
(2002: 116), “ref lects the principles it is at-
tempting to defend.” For example, Japan fre-
quently points out that main reason for intro-
duc i ng  t he  morat or iu m was  sc ient i f ic 
uncertainty about whale numbers; research 
whaling is therefore both necessary and legal 
(BBC News 2008). A central belief that drives 
the Japanese position is the principle of sus-
tainable use of resources: the minke whale 
population, for example, is abundant. “It would 
be good if we were not causing any bad feel-
ings,” deputy whaling commissioner Joji 
Morishita says, “but sometimes issues of sci-
ence and principle might be more important 
than simple issues of emotion” (BBC News 
2008). Thus, until recently, legal and scientific 
principles provided Japan with a large degree 
of immunity from international pressure.
Japan’s principle-based position came un-
der threat in April 2014 when the International 
Court of Justice — in a case brought by Aus-
tralia, one of Japan’s closest friends in the re-
gion — ruled that Japan’s “research” whaling 
was not scientific and ordered Japan to halt 
whaling in the Antarctic (Japan News 2014d). 
Specifically, the scientific output of the re-
search program was deemed not proportionate 
to the number of animals killed (Japan News 
2014d). Given Japan’s principle of respecting 
international law, the Japanese government 
had little choice but to vow to respect the rul-
ing and promise to abide by the court’s deci-
sion. The fact that in recent territorial disputes 
with its neighbours, particularly China, Japan 
has consistently presented itself as a country 
that conforms to the rule of international law 
made such a response inevitable.6
However, in the September 2014 IWC meet 
in Slovakia, despite sharp condemnation from 
US and other representatives, Japan declared 
its intention to continue whaling for scientific 
purposes in the Antarctic after reviewing its 
programme and submitting a new research 
plan (Japan News 2014a). Although in June 
2015 the scientific committee of the IWC raised 
doubts about the need for lethal sampling, the 
Japanese government announced that the 
country’s Antarctic whale hunt would be re-
sumed that year (Japan Times 2015a). This 
suggests that legal and scientific principles are 
not the main driving force behind Japanese 
whaling that Danaher suggests. 
4. Whale Hunting and Domestic Pressure
As detailed earlier, the “two-level game” 
model requires we look at the domestic situa-
tion to understand why international pressure 
does or does not work. In Japan’s case, the 
weakness of the domestic anti-whaling lobby 
means foreign pressure has difficulty resonat-
ing within the country. “Foreign demands on 
Japan to stop whaling,” writes Danaher (2002: 
116), “are not aligning with any powerful do-
mestic constituencies, whereas the domestic 
political pressure on Japan to continue whaling 
is great.”
In Japan, the pro-whaling lobby is ex-
tremely strong while the anti-whaling lobby is 
markedly weak. The key pro-whaling groups 
are the Fisheries Agency7 (Suisancho¯), the pro-
whaling parliamentary groups (Hogei Gi’in 
Renmei and Hogei Taisaku Gi’in Kyogikai),8 
and the fishing industry. These voices are sup-
 6 The ICJ ruling also pushed online retailer Rakuten to end all sales of whale and dolphin meat, suggesting that 
while international pressure may have little effect on the Japanese government it can influence those Japanese 
firms with a global presence (The Guardian 2014).
 7 Whales, of course, are not fish but historically they have been treated as such: in the past they were referred to as 
isana or “brave fish”. Even today, the character for whale contains the fish radical.
 8 Whaling is supported by all Japanese political parties. Japan’s Green Party (Midori no Mirai) has no national 
political presence.
8plemented by semi-governmental pro-whaling 
NPOs (such as the Japan Whaling Association 
or JWA, and the Institute of Cetacean Re-
search or ICR), and a sympathetic media.9 In 
contrast, anti-whaling voices are limited to a 
small number of environmental NGOs (such as 
Greenpeace Japan10 and Elsa Nature Conserv-
ancy) while the Environmental Ministry (EA) 
remains silent on the issue.11 As Danaher 
(2002: 111) notes, “there is no substantial anti-
whaling coverage in the mainstream news 
media...the numbers of people willing to be out-
spoken against whaling are very limited.” Un-
surprisingly, public opinion is firmly in favour 
of whaling, though this has begun to change. In 
an April 2014 opinion poll, while 23.6% disa-
greed with whaling against 45.5% who said 
they agreed, the latter was down by 11.7% 
since June 2013 (Yomiuri Shimbun 2014). A 
2012 poll found 27% of the respondents sup-
porting whaling and 11% opposed, with young-
er respondents more likely to be opposed (The 
Daily Beast 2013). While the number of “don’t 
know’s” has remained consistently high, sup-
port does seem to be eroding compared to past 
surveys.12 It is possible that an increasingly 
popular whale-watching industry and a grow-
ing engagement in whale rescues (Danaher 
2002: 113-114) have influenced public opinion.
It might be natural to assume that eco-
nomic profits underlie the dominance of the 
pro-whaling lobby in Japan. However, the com-
mercial viability of the whaling industry is 
highly questionable. “The Japanese whaling 
industry, which employs only a few hundred 
people and generates at best marginal profits,” 
writes Hirata (2005: 130), “is too small and 
weak to influence government policy.” In fact, 
the government spends large amounts of tax-
payer’s money on subsidising stockpiles13 of 
whale meat which few Japanese want to eat. In 
a 2009 report, for example, the World Wildlife 
Fund (2009) found that Japanese subsidies for 
whaling had amounted to US$164 million since 
1988. However, the existence of such subsidies 
is generally not well known in Japan. For ex-
ample, in October 2012 when Greenpeace Ja-
pan publicised the fact that the Institute of Ce-
tacean Research was provided with 2.28 billion 
yen ($29 million) in financial assistance from 
the earthquake reconstruction fund to increase 
security for the whaling fleet it made headlines 
in foreign media outlets (e.g. The Guardian 
2011; USA Today 2011) but received little at-
 9 For details on media censorship of whaling issues, see Kagawa-Fox (2009: 405).
 10 Greenpeace Japan, established in 1989, has much less visibility or voice than it does in many other countries. Most 
NGOs/NPOs in Japan are small, local ones with few or no employees; Japan has few large, professionally man-
aged national organisations, such as Greenpeace. Pekkanen (2006) calls this Japan’s “dual civil society” and 
highlights strict state oversight and regulations as one explanation.
 11 Hirata (2005: 129) sees whaling as a puzzling exception in a country that has been a key player in various global 
environmental initiatives. The EA’s silence is even more ironic given its promotion of the “The Minamata Con-
vention on Mercury” which calls for new controls and reductions of the use of mercury worldwide, to “prevent it 
from polluting the environment and damaging the health of the world’s population” (The Daily Beast 2013). Whale 
meat contains high levels of mercury.
 12 Although the Japanese government frequently takes public opinion polls on a variety of issues (http://survey.gov-
online.go.jp/index-all.html), they have not asked if people were for or against whaling since 2001. In that year, 
75.5% expressed support for a question about whether countries should be able to hunt whales “in a sustainable 
fashion if based on science” (Cabinet Office 2001). Most questions in the survey were actually about people’s 
knowledge of the IWC and Japan’s whaling culture, such as, “Did you know Japan has used whales since the Jo-
mon period?”
 13 As well as stockpiling meat from research whaling (known as “by-product”) which Japan is allowed — indeed 
obliged — to do under IWC rules, Japan also imports whale-meat from Norway and Iceland. As of May 2015, in-
ventories were at 1,157 tons, the lowest since March 2000, party as a result of the ICJ ruling and Japan’s suspen-
sion of its Antarctic whaling (Japan Times 2015d). To alleviate this “shortage”, a ship carrying 1,700 tons of 
whale meat left Iceland for Japan in June 2015 (Japan Times 2015c). 
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tention in the major Japanese dailies.14
Given the amount of subsidies detailed 
above, it is possible to question Hirata’s conten-
tion that financial issues are irrelevant. Kaga-
wa-Fox (2009) concurs, arguing that whaling 
policy is driven by “vested” interests seeking 
financial advantage, what she calls the “Whal-
ing Iron Triangle”: the Fisheries Agency, the 
ICR, and the Japan Fisheries Association 
(JFA), which represents Japan’s fishing indus-
try as a whole. Certainly, the fishing industry 
does have influence above and beyond its actu-
al impact on the economy; nevertheless, it is not 
profit that keeps whaling afloat in Japan but 
more the fact that the end of whaling would 
mean a decline in the political clout of the Fish-
eries Agency (Hirata 2005: 146).
In sum, domestic support for whaling is not 
pushed by so much economic demand but by po-
litical ideology. “Whaling in Japan is essentially 
not driven by demand by gourmands and spe-
cialty restaurants,” observes Salles (2014), “but 
by the Japanese government itself, which fi-
nances and subsidizes the supply of whale 
meat.” To be more specific, whaling in Japan is 
largely driven by the Fisheries Agency who 
have skillfully built up the issue and re-defined 
it as “a policy issue of national interest to pro-
tect its own interests from foreign pressure” 
(Danaher 2002: 116). By expanding the whaling 
issue into a symbolic one of “traditional culture, 
national pride, food security and sovereignty” 
(Danaher 2002: 116) it has in effect insulated 
whaling from criticism and largely silenced its 
domestic critics. In other words, as Watanabe 
suggested earlier, whaling has become a con-
servative ideological project of the state, closely 
tied with national identity. Kalland and Moeran 
(1992: 194-5) suggest that one of the reasons 
this re-definition has been so successful is, in 
the post-war period at least, the lack of national 
symbols acceptable to all Japanese: “In this 
vacuum of national symbols, whale meat has 
provided a particularly powerful image,” they 
write, “…and the whaling issue serves to 
strengthen the much cherished Japanese myths 
about their identity (nihonjinron), which itself 
helps fuel one form of Japanese nationalism.”
The potency of the whale as a unique na-
tional symbol has heightened in recent years as 
Japanese politics has taken on a more conserv-
ative, even nationalistic bent. The (first) Abe 
administration’s 2006 reform of the fundamen-
tal law on education marked the beginning of a 
push to teach patriotism and tradition in 
schools and to foster Japanese citizens who love 
their country. One relevant example are the 
moves since 2005 to put (heavily subsidised) 
whale meat back on school lunch menus in or-
der to teach children about the school lunches 
“Japanese schools have served in the past” — 
and perhaps also to stimulate demand for 
whale meat at the same time (Japan Times 
2010). In 2013, the Fisheries Agency set a goal 
of doubling its distribution of whale meat to 
school-lunch programs (The Daily Beast 2013).
5. Conclusion: International Pressure as 
Counter-Productive
In November 2012 in Shibuya, Tokyo, a 
demonstration against the hunting of whales 
and dolphins was organised by The Society to 
Protect Marine Mammals (Kaiyo¯ Honyu¯rui o 
Mamoru Kai), a Japanese grassroots group 
(http://amm-japan.jimdo.com/). It was appar-
ently the first ever locally organised demon-
stration (an earlier September rally was said to 
have broken up after it was disrupted by right-
wing counter protesters).15 A counter-demon-
 14 Stories were carried in the Tokyo (2012) and Nikkei (2012) newspapers. Although the north-eastern coast, includ-
ing the coastal whaling town of Ayukawa, was indeed devastated by the tsunami, criticism was centred on use of 
the fund for something other than recovery efforts.
 15 For more information see: http://www.japansubculture.com/japanese-citizens-protest-against-japans-dolphin-
hunting-and-whale-research/
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stration was held at the same time sponsored 
by an organisation roughly translated as “Japa-
nese National’s Group denouncing the anti-
Japanese group Sea Shepherd” (Nihon Sabetsu 
Shu¯dan Sea Shepherd o Kyu¯dan suru Kokumin 
no Kai), with support from Zaitokukai, a group 
known for organising the anti-Korean hate-
speech protests mentioned in section one. The 
Zaitokukai website carried the following de-
tails:
Throw Sea-Shepherd out from Japan! An 
Angry Counter Demonstration against the 
Anti-Dolphin Hunting/Anti-Whaling Pro-
test in Shibuya
In support of environmental terrorist 
group Sea-Shepherd’s “Global Anti-Dol-
phin Hunting/Anti-Whaling Movement”, 
an SS [Sea-Shepherd]-type demonstration 
in Shibuya, Tokyo will be held. We will 
hold a counter-demonstration to show our 
anger as Japanese towards Westerners 
who should be ashamed at their discrimi-
nation of [our country’s] Food Culture” 
(Zaitokukai 2012, author’s translation)
One of the most salient points here is how the 
issue has been framed as Japan vs. the West, 
specifically the Japanese as victims of Western 
discrimination, imperialism, and “Japan-bash-
ing”. Consequently, the demonstration was por-
trayed as driven by a foreign group when in 
fact it was organised by Japanese citizens with 
the majority of activists present Japanese. The 
message that whaling is inherently tied with 
the Japanese race was personified by one of the 
placards which read, “Killing the practice of 
whale hunting is the same as killing the Japa-
nese people” (The Daily Beast 2013). Other plac-
ards (written in English) attacked “white su-
premacy” and “white pigs.” The ideology of race 
has thus become the central feature of recent 
pro-whaling demonstrations. For example, in 
February 2010, protests against Sea Shep-
herd’s “racially motivated attacks”16 on the 
Japanese whaling fleet were held in front of the 
Australian Embassy (https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=5Dwh0oLYPrA). More recently, 
in April 2014, demonstrations outside the Aus-
tralian Embassy labeled Australia as a “racist 
country” and criticised “white westerners” de-
stroying Japanese whaling culture (http://
www.yamatopress.com/c/40/187/8708/). In sum, 
the issue of whaling has become one of racial 
prejudice, discrimination, and persecution by 
white people against the Japanese race.
The prominence of the Sea Shepherd name 
in the anti-whaling discourse reflects the ris-
ing profile of the US marine conservation group 
and its heightened harassment of the Japanese 
whaling fleet. In 2012, a US court granted an 
injunction, in a case brought by the ICR, 
against Sea Shepherd, ordering it to cease its 
“dangerous protests”; in 2014, the group was 
found to be in contempt of court and in June 
2015 paid $2.55 million in damages due to its 
“continued obstruction of whaling vessels” (Ja-
pan Times 2014; 2015e). In this way, Sea Shep-
herd’s actions have become a focal point for the 
pro-whaling voices in Japan. As Ishii (2011), 
Hirata (2005: 149), and Miyaoka (2004: 95) 
have argued, such militant actions have “back-
fired” by fuelling nationalist sentiments and 
boosting the demand for whale meat, thereby 
prolonging the life of the whaling industry. As 
Blok (2008: 41) asserts, the pro-whaling move-
ment is essentially a counter-movement, a reac-
tive moral challenge “to the identity claims es-
poused by the global anti-whaling community.” 
The growing polarisation of the debate, with 
 16 Although Sea Shepherd has taken pains to point out that it has also taken action against Canadian sealers and 
other non-Japanese groups, racism is not entirely absent from the Sea Shepherd rhetoric: “The brutal killing of 
whales has become an icon for the Japanese identity. This is not unusual. Japan has always closely identified 
with blood and slaughter. From the decapitations by the Samurai upon innocent peasants to the suicidal insanity 
of the Kamikaze, violence and self destruction have been a part of Japanese culture” (Watson 2006).
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“Western” moral and green arguments being 
matched in emotional intensity by the Japa-
nese emphasis on national pride and identity, 
make prospects for a compromise further than 
they have ever been. A first step towards recon-
ciliation would be, perhaps non-intuitively, to 
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